It don't mean a thing if you ain't got that swing:
So
far we've discussed past voting trends. And popes. And misguided
attempts at fame through cartographic systems that flip statisticians
the bird. But most relevantly the trends thing. Unfortunately the
past can only tell us so much about the future; trust me, I'm an
archaeologist. This week we look at margins and swings, the
apparently ubiquitous means of determining how safe – or not – a
seat is. There is nothing wrong with this methodology, assuming it is
used only when appropriate and that its shortcomings are understood.
All too often this is not the case.
Any
truly marginal seat is marginal because it could go either way. It
is, by nature, unpredictable. However there is no hard-line between
safe and precarious. All seats exist on a continuum of
knife-edgedness, some more knife-edgey than others. While looking at
past trends is one way to measure this, margins use the percentage of
the vote that gives the current incumbent an edge over the other
candidates last election (or by-election). For example, a seat with a
margin of 6% means the incumbent has 6% more of the votership's
support than her (or his) nearest rival. In our system, candidates
are slowly eliminated until there are only two left, so this is the
same as a 47-53 split of the votes.
6%
is actually not too shabby. By the standard measures in Australia
anything less than 6% is “marginal” and anything up to (but not
including) 10% is “fairly safe”. “Safe” covers 10% onwards
and 20% upwards is “very safe”. So 6% is fairly safe, but only
marginally fairly safe. In the early years some MPs were elected
unopposed, which is technically a 100% margin and “very safe”,
although it obviously says nothing meaningful about the outcomes if
someone else were to run next time.
The
idea behind this approach to knife-edgeiness is that certain
demographics vote in certain ways. Urban seats typically hold more
left-wing voters while rural seats generally lean to the right. As
such, certain areas will have a base of dedicated voters who –
short of a major scandal or other significant event – hold a strong
allegiance to one party (or at least to one set of ideals) and will
consistently vote accordingly, immune to all the campaigning. Some
seats will have a small number of such voters, others will have many,
possibly even being dominated by them. In some seats these “rusted
on” supporters will be split rather evenly between parties,
negating each other, and in others they will present as a significant
head-start for one party or another.
To
pick an example, a rural seat with a large block of firm right-wing
voters will give more right-wing candidates a head start. If the
general result of the campaign leads to the remaining “swinging”
voters mostly voting right then the margin should be pretty
substantial. If the campaign leans the other way the seat will be
less safe for the right party or possibly even a marginal left seat.
The margin will be small, though, and the predictable swing back
will see the seat return to its former position. In other words, a
seat with a lot of campaign-proof, right-wing voters will normally
lie between being strong right-wing and weak left-wing seats over the
years.
This
becomes particularly relevant at the following election. If the seat
is “safe” (i.e. its margin exceeds 10%), we can predict the seat
is unlikely to change since the swing away from the incumbent would
have to be equally substantial. (If an election leads to more people
voting for a party than last time, there is said to be a swing to
that party. This swing is measured again as a percentage of the
voters, and can be measured for the nation as a whole or on a
seat-by-seat basis.) In the above example a swing to the left would
mean a marginal right seat becomes more marginal, possibly changing
hands, or a marginal left seat becomes safer for the left-wing party.
It would also make a dent in a safe right seat, but swings of over
10% are rare, so it would most likely remain as is.
Uh huh...
The
upshot of all this is that each seat has a numerical value relating
to its knife-edgeosity – its margin. And we all know what happens
when someone gives me a numerical value for each seat...
Data
from
http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/2013/01/2013-federal-election-pendulum.html.
Thanks Antony.
The
map above gives each seat a colour whose paleness is determined by
its margin. The lighter the seat, the more marginal it is. And, as per
tradition, red is Labor, blue is Coalition, green is Green and grey
is the bottom drawer where we put everything else.
This
is the normal way of assessing how safe a seat is. It assumes,
however, that all seats are equally volatile. In reality, a seat that
consistently supports a party with a margin of 5% is less tenuous
than a seat that currently supports them by 8% but regularly has
swings of 10% or more. The only way to judge seat volatility is
through past voting trends, which I have previously discussed.
Ideally a combination of trends and margins would be used (as I
proposed in a previous conclusion here) however no-one seems to do this, and I cannot
find the necessary data. Perhaps no one has done this because the
data is so hard to obtain (though I strongly expect professional
psephologists should be able to get their hands on it from some
archive somewhere), or perhaps the data is so hard to obtain because
no one bothers to do this kind of analysis.
Another
error with this two-party preferred approach is that its focus is
purely on the incumbent, and suggest all marginal seats are within
reach of any party – or at least any major party – yet a marginal Coalition seat is not necessarily within the grasp of the ALP (and
vice versa). The seat of O'Connor, for example, is marginal. It's
margin is only 3.6 for the National party. However, that is a 3.6%
lead over the Liberals. The ALP and other parties do not come close,
so although the Nationals hold the seat by less than 4%, it is still
a very safe Coalition seat.
Data
from http://www.aec.gov.au/
This
map assigns colour based on the proportion of the vote won by each
party-group. Because I am not a huge fan of the two-party mentality,
I've tried to represent the nightmare that is the multi-party
division of votes. Here, red, blue and green are as before, but
Independents and other minor parties are represented by white.
The
more red a seat has, the more people there voted ALP. More blue means
more Coalition voters. Higher green values relate to stronger support
for the Greens. The most marginal seats will sit somewhere between
these extremes, ranging from purple to yellow to aqua. Paler seats
have a larger proportion of votes going to the 'others'.
If
we ramp up the contrast as a rough rule of thumb, we see most seats
turn either red or blue. Some with a higher Greens vote – mostly
east-coast, inner metropolitan seats – turn black. The mainland
independents' seats become white due to the high 'others' votes. But
of particular interest are three inner-metropolitan seats near Sydney
(Lindsey, Greenway and Watson) which are magenta. This indicates that
the Labor-Coalition primary vote split is extremely close here.
Lindsey and Greenway are among the numerous marginal seats of map 1,
but Watson has a 9.1% margin – the safer end of the 'fairly safe'
range. In fact, the primaries are split only by 180 votes – nothing
in a seat with over 12,000 votes for 'other'. What this map
highlights, that the first does not, is that this seat could change –
with an apparently massive swing – entirely because of preferences
(see below). The moral of this post, then, is to never rely on only
one method for analysing data. Sometimes the ubiquitous standard of
margins does not tell the whole story.
Discussion:
Obviously
both maps have their advantages and disadvantages. The first is
straight forward and easy to read, simplifying the entire concept
(but I am sure it has some good points too...). Ignoring O'Connor, as
noted above, it is easy to spot the most marginal seats (for example
Corangamite, Denison and Macquarie, which stand out due to their
size). These lighter-coloured seats can be hard to identify for one
party-group or another so it is not immediately obvious, for example,
that both major parties have three seats with margins under 1% and
about half a dozen more under 2%. Beyond the spatial distribution of
marginal and safe seats, this map really offers little that cannot be
read from the raw data.
The
second map shows who the margin is against and where other parties
rank, once you get your head around the colour coding. O'Connor is no
longer as marginal as the initial map suggested, although there are
other ways of fixing this for Map 1.
The
point is not to determine which map is better. Many professionals
would say Map 1, and perhaps that is more useful in
general.
The point is that Map 1 is not the be-all-and-end-all of seat safety
as determined by the previous distribution of votes. Multiple
methodologies should be implemented as appropriate and in conjunction
with each other.
Seeing
as I have been politely humoured so far, I should probably begin to
justify my use of three colours throughout my posts. Having vocally
disapproved of the two-party preferred mentality, it may
superficially appear that I have simply shifted to an equally
erroneous three-party approach.
In
practice, there are technical limitations to using more than three
colours. In maps where more than one colour is used for an area –
as in map two where green, red and blue overlap to varying degrees in
each seat – it is problematic to use any other colours. Since red,
green and blue are the primary colours for screen displays, every
other colour can be made by combining these. Yellow, for example,
could be used to represent a fourth party, but could also be the
result of a red-green overlap. In Map 2 a marginal seat between the
ALP and Greens would be indistinguishable from a safe yellow seat.
The
choice of ALP, Coalition and Greens not only works well with the
three available colours, but as they are the only parties with seats
in the lower house, they are the obvious and most practical choices.
I have, nonetheless, attempted to consistently represent the impacts
of other minor parties and independents as white or grey as
necessitated by the methodology. At times these limitations lead to
ambiguity, and I do not know how to resolve this. In Map 2, seats won
by independents naturally have a large 'others' component, although
this could equally be divided among a great many 'others'.
Regardless, 'others' is not a practical indicator. A safe seat for a
left-wing, retiring independent is unlikely to be won by 'others' if
the only other 'others' are right-wing independents or minor parties.
For both of these reasons it is probably best to treat these seats as
having a lot of potential voters with unknown allegiances –
potentially volatile, especially where the incumbent is retiring or,
contrary to the implications of the colour scheme, is not an 'other'.
This
can occur because primary votes do not equate to actual seat wins.
The Seat of Denison in Tasmania is a good example of this. Despite
being held by an Independent, the Liberals had marginally more
primary votes than the 'others' and the ALP had almost 9,000 votes
more (which is equal to roughly 15% of the valid votes for that
seat). In order to ensure every vote counts, there is a flow-on
effect in our electoral system. In a seat with one right-wing party
and five left-wing parties it is easy to see how a strong left-wing
majority could be divided such that a right-wing party has the most
votes. In our electoral system, the least-supported party is
eliminated and the votes distributed by their second preference, so
that in all probability a left-wing party will eventually triumph.
This redistribution of votes in Denison was enough to give the
incumbent a 1.2% margin over the ALP in the end. Thus a seat with a
lot of 'other' votes could represent one strong candidate or many
fragmented 'others' that have their votes redistributed among other
parties.
This
also causes issues in the more traditional first map. These two-party
preferred margins are grossly modified by the redistribution of
preferences. Many people may follow the provided 'how to vote'
pamphlets each election, which means margins of one party over
another could be entirely reversed by a third party's deals that sees
second- or third-hand preferences switch allegiance. Watson, our
surprise magenta seat, is a case in point. Further more, some
'others' running last election may not run this time, and visa versa.
Thousands of former 'others' votes could switch their final
allegiance even if the political climate did not change one iota.
Watson could change hands, with a swing of almost 10% or more, purely
because a minor political party has disbanded. The two-party
preferred margins suddenly don't look as solid as they had.
Margins
and swings are often used as the main (or even the only) model of how
the nation stands before the election, and it is this that I object
to. These issues I have mentioned above are not necessarily fatal to
the pendulum models – margins are undoubtedly very useful – but
should serve as a warning that other forms of analysis should be
awarded equal consideration. Combined with trends, margins can offer
a very good indication of each party's starting positions. With
targeted polling, it is possible to extrapolate national trends and
make decent predictions. But never rely on a single method – be it
margins or anything else. As the seat of Watson illustrated, there is
a lot more to consider than the simple continuum of the pendulum that
you will no doubt see repeated often in the lead up to the election.
And now that you have been forewarned of the common over-reliance on
the pendulum, you can respond with a knowing smile.
Next
week we will hopefully look at the upcoming WA state elections upon
the eve of the ballot. After that we may do some analysis of the
results and what they might imply federally, or divert onto another
topic. The conclave might even have concluded by then, so who knows
what topic – or topics – might come out in a tangled Gordian Knot
of words and maps.
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