Friday 30 April 2021

Tasmania's Blind Election

The Tasmanian election (today by the time this is posted) is a bit of a flashback to an earlier age for me, both in terms of methodology and forcing me to log in to my long-disused facebook. Back in the early days I'd cobble together some unreliable statistics from dubious sources and see if they were any use in predicting an election. Since then the Infographinomicon has become a little repetitive in applying polling to the existing pendulum and looking at outliers.

This will not be possible for Tasmania in 2021.

During this election there has been a single poll, and this is not a particularly reliable poll for a number of reasons set out rather fulsomely by Dr Bonham here. An analysis of what the outcome would look like if this were accurate is also already provided beyond that link, leaving little for us to do over this side.

Other than these numbers, the only 2021 data is from February. Also, of course, Tasmania's legislative assembly has multi-member seats assigned by the Hare-Clark system which doesn't lend itself to a pendulum in the way most lower houses in Australia do.

Working in the Dark

Without good polling data, we have a golden opportunity to reach for alternative analogues for popularity and test these out. My first thought was to look at the number of hits on the Liberal and Labor homepages. Although this would mostly capture politically engaged voters and a good number of people comparing both parties' policies, it is possible that more hits indicate an engaging news section drawing in undecideds or an enthusiastic support base sharing election materials regularly.

Unfortunately, neither party's page was pulling in enough traffic to show up on any of the trackers I consulted.


Not to fear--the prominent social media icons at the top of the party pages gave me another idea. Is is possible to look at social media metrics, such as Twitter, to get a feel for which party was doing better. Obviously a comparison of raw numbers like follower counts would include a lot of uncontrolled variables: political bias of Twitter users generally, different degrees of incorporation of twitter in other forms of communication, frequency and content of posts, and echo chambers could drive follower counts far more than voting intention.

Instead, what was needed was some kind of controlled measure. A value that was adjusted for engagement patterns and participation. An equation. A ratio.

Now for the benefit of those not involved in twitter--I am one of you--it's worth explaining what it means to be ratioed. Particularly in political discourse online, getting a lot of likes is a demonstration of support but getting a lot of comments or replies is generally not. A high comment-to-like ratio is generally taken as a sign you've either (a) said something grossly offensive or (b) expressed a negative opinion about some form of media with a large devoted following.

Obviously the extremes of being ratioed, where comments outnumber likes several times over, is unlikely to be a frequent occurrence on state or territory political tweets. But could even relatively tame like-to-comment ratios provide an analogue for political popularity? As it turns out... I don't know.

https://twitter.com/TasLiberal Poll Comment Retweet Like
Today N/A 5 7 13
This week N/A 86 143 237
15-23 Feb 52 200 18 13
17-23 Nov 52 N/A N/A N/A
18-24 August 54 N/A N/A N/A
3-10 Mar 43 10 7 7










https://twitter.com/tasmanianlabor Poll Comment Retweet Like
Today N/A 34 262 761
This week N/A 48 326 943
15-23 Feb 27 5 30 100
17-23 Nov 25 19 29 64
18-24 August 24 2 0 4
3-10 Mar 34 N/A N/A N/A

The data isn't there to assess this for Tasmania. I couldn't find dates for May polling to compare with to test this hypothesis, so these are omitted. The Liberal account tweeted too infrequently to find multiple tweets that aligned with a polling period. Labor only started tweeting last year, meaning there is no data for comparison to March polling and low engagement generally prior to the campaign.

Where data was available, it was too erratic to interpret. In February, Labor had an incredibly positive 20:1 like-to-comment ratio while the Liberals were below 0.07. In November, when polling was very similar, Labor's ratio was a more reasonable 3.37. There was also a lot of variability in the posts--high enagement seemed to align with retweets of federal political material which would eclipse state-relevant tweets. Comments, particularly on new accounts like Labors, seemed to be positive from loyal supporters and don't indicate negative interactions the way they do on larger established accounts. And, as an American dictionary points out high numbers of comments can be positive even then though this is not aligned with the pejorative nature of the word "ratioed".

With larger social media interactions over a longer period of time, perhaps correlations might emerge. There could be an interesting thesis project for someone looking at twitter ratios as a reflection of public attitude that expands this to look at tweets compared with television ratings or brand sales. But for our immediate question of who will win today's election there is nothing to be gained here.

This is disappointing, as this could have led to analysis of individual politicians' twitters to determine their personal polling. But this had other problems too--the large number or retweets, the variable prevalence of personal tweeting and the number of candidates without an active twitter.

Facebook provided a tempting alternative, with more consistent messaging, extensive post histories and more descriptive engagement options such as anger or sadness (though it was not always clear if a response was angry at the poster or their opponent who was criticised in the post). However, this huge number of posts and un uncooperative interface made it too difficult to recover the necessary data.

Return to Simplicity

Instead, as time rapidly runs out, let us try something less inventive but more promising. Here is a table of every Tasmanian election of the 21st century:


2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 Minimum
Bass Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Grn Lib Lib  
ALP ALP ALP Grn ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Braddon Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP Grn Lib Lib  
ALP ALP ALP Lib ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Denison/ Clark Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib  
ALP ALP Grn Grn Grn Grn
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Franklin Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib  
ALP ALP Grn Lib Grn Grn
ALP ALP ALP Grn ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Lyons Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib  
ALP ALP Grn Lib Lib  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP

In the 'Minimum' column it is assumed, perhaps unjustifiably given all of 2020 and the recent WA election, that the Tasmanian election will sit somewhere within previously established extremes. For example, in Bass and Braddon the Liberals have always won at least two seats, so this is assumed to be the case today also. Denison (now Clark) and Lyons likewise have always returned at least two ALP MLAs, and Denison/Clark and Franklin consistently elect a green (for Clark this seems almost assured unless there is a massive rebuke of the Greens as this would be the party leader).

Although on-the-ground reports suggest otherwise, the expected dominant theme of the early Tas election was COVID-19. Excluding the most recent and dubious poll, it seems after March 2020 when the pandemic was declared, the incumbent Liberals' popularity shot up over 50% on first preference--higher than the 2018 election. We might assume, then, that every previous Liberal seat is safe.


2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 COVID-19
Bass Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP ALP Grn ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Braddon Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP Grn Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP ALP Lib ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Denison/ Clark Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP Grn Grn Grn Grn
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Franklin Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP Grn Lib Grn Grn
ALP ALP ALP Grn ALP  
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
Lyons Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Grn Grn Lib Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP Grn Lib Lib Lib
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP
ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP ALP

This assumption alone gives the Liberal party its majority back, but only leaves three gaps. In Bass the Liberals are at their 21st century maximum, so the last seat is between a Green candidate and Labor's Jennifer Houston (it is taken for granted the one Labor seat guaranteed will be Michelle O'Byrne as deputy Labor leader). The same polls that have Liberals above 2018 levels keep Labor under 30% first preference, which would be likely to favour the Greens who only failed to win a seat once.

The other two gaps are tougher to call, but the fundamental question is whether we are really seeing a return to 2014 levels of Labor losses where they polled 27.33%. The reliable but dated polling suggests so, but it's anyone's guess. I'm going to live dangerously and suggest this is the case.

One other point worth considering--in Clark the high profile, now independent Sue Hickey may win a seat. As a former Liberal I would suggest she might replace a blue seat, but others point out her campaign is quite attractive to the left and could replace a red or green. For simplicity I'm sticking to my above guesses for the following final prediction:


Prediction
Bass Lib
Lib
Lib
Grn
ALP
Braddon Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib
ALP
Denison/ Clark Lib
Lib
Grn
ALP
ALP
Franklin Lib
Lib
Lib
Grn
ALP
Lyons Lib
Lib
Lib
ALP
ALP